Collapse+of+Pier+34


 * Collapse of Pier 34 **

** Technology is inevitably intertwined with society and culture. One could say that it acts as a mirror; it reveals to us, volumes about the society that creates and deploys it. Moreover, it is rarely perfect. Imprinted within it, is the underlying psychology of the choices and the necessary compromises that people make during its creation and use. Here, using the collapse of Pier 34 as an example of how over time, and through series of events, the decision made by its operational structure in regards to its use and/or misuse, would leave an undeniable impact on our society and culture.
 * Introduction

** Not long after the arrival of William Penn in the late 1600’s, Penn set out to establish Philadelphia as great port city by the Delaware River. During the early years of its history, port of Philadelphia grew and flourished due to interest of private entities, and built much of the facilities and piers. Slowly, the port of Philadelphia became the preeminent center for trade and commerce on the east coast. At first, the development of the port had gone on without too much influence from governing authorities. But soon the city saw a need to oversee the development and started a more hands-on approach to the oversight.
 * The History of the Waterfront and Pier 34

By the time 20th century came around, the task of building and maintaining the facilities of the port came under the supervision of Department of Wharves, Docks, and Ferries (a division of Department of Commerce of Philadelphia). But the task became too much of a burden for the city. As a result, in 1965 a new nonprofit, quasi-public port agency, the Philadelphia Port Corporation was formed to oversee the development; in which the agency had the authority to issue municipal bonds, and leased its facilities to private companies. These companies operated autonomously, with only minor assistance in the form of marketing by Philadelphia Port Corporation. Although the agency had authority over the facilities that it operated, it had a laissez-faire attitude towards maintenance and inspection of the privately owned facilities and piers. These sentiments continued, and were adapted by the city of Philadelphia and Department of License and Inspection, in fact no governing body or agency in Philadelphia (nor any federal, state level for that matter) had authority on how often the piers are inspected, or any requirement in evaluation of structural integrity. L&I would only review building plans but did not require any other periodic engineering inspection reports. Contrary to what one might think, city of Philadelphia never consulted any other cities or municipalities in regards of inspection of their respective piers. As a result, prior to collapse of Pier 34, 147 piers in the area were basically unregulated. This fact would later implicate the city of Philadelphia and Department of L&I in the civil suit that followed.

According to court documents, Pier 34 situated at 734 S. Columbus Blvd was built as a facility for loading coal in 1890. The pier was constructed by driving over 2500 piles, each measuring over 70 feet in length and 18 inches wide into the river bed forming its foundation. Then a wooden platform layered with 8 feet of fill dirt capped the piles, with cement seawall surrounding the fill dirt, and with another cement pavement covering the fill dirt. And in 1909, Pier 34 was extensively expanded, reaching out 557 feet into the Delaware River making it the longest on the river. In 1984, Michael Asbell of Portside Investors purchased the pier for reported $850,000 and leased to Eli Karetny, the head of HMS Ventures, Inc in 1992, and opened Eli’s Pier 34 nightclub. By 1995, Karetny was in talks with HMS Ventures owner Dorrance Hamilton to bring a 394-foot ship The Moshulu to Pier 34 as a floating restaurant. But instead of investing, Hamilton lent Karetny $500,000 for pier repairs. And later, Hamilton decided to go forward with docking The Moshulu. Then in May of 1996, The Moshulu opened for business, and later that year HMS purchased Eli’s Pier 34 nightclub from Karenty, and renamed it as Heat nightclub. Tragically, on May 18, 2000 just a little past 8PM, Pier 34 collapsed into Delaware River taking along with it, 43 patrons and workers, killing three women.

The Who’s Who ** The collapse of Pier 34 injured 43, and cut short the lives of three young women: Monica Rodriguez, 21, Jean Marie Ferraro, 27 both from Cherry Hill, N.J., and DeAnn White, 25 from Philadelphia, P.A. All three were employees of New Jersey State Aquarium a little distance away on the Delaware River. The trio had gone out for what was supposes to be a night of joy filled celebration of White’s birthday and Rodriguez’s first day at the job.

Entangled in the event is the pier owner Michael Asbell the head of Portside Investors, Eli Karetny president of HMS Ventures, the company that owned the Moshulu restaurant and Heat Nightclub, and the principal funding source Dorrance H. Hamiton, the sole director and stockholder of HMS Ventures, and heiress of Campbell’s Soup. Asbell and Karetny were the defendants in the case of Pier 34 collapse. No charges were ever filed against Hamilton. Also involved in this case was owner of S.T Hudson Engineering, Samuel Hudson, whose company was responsible for performing inspection of the pier. Robert Hudson and Jesse Tyson, president and vice president respectively, of J.E. Brenneman Co. that was in charge of repair work on Pier 34. Furthermore, J.E. Brenneman Co. later evolved into Commerce Construction of which Jesse Tyson is also the senior vice president. J.E. Brenneman would be responsible for under water inspection, done by diver Jack Morey and Joe Moore. After the collapse, HMS Ventures would later sue S.T Hudson, J.E. Brenneman Co., Commerce Constructions, Jesse Tyson and Robert Hudson for $25 million in damages.

On November 3 of 1994, winter ice collided with pier pilings and caused a 200-foot portion of the parking lot collapses into the Delaware River. A short while later, in December of that year, S.T Hudson Engineering conducted an inspection on the pier and determined that in addition to collapse of the parking lot, where some vertical piles were missing, wooden planks under the fill was tilted downwards. Moreover there were cracks in the concrete seawall and the north side seawall was extremely fragmented and was on the verge of falling over. Not long after S.T. Hudson’s discovery, in 1995 Karenty entered talks with Dorrance Hamilton to lend Karenty $500,000 for parking area repairs and plans of bring The Moshulu to the pier. This was an undeniable fact that shows Hamilton knew about the condition of the pier. During the same year, J.E. Brenneman Construction were contracted to carry out the parking lot repairs.
 * The Warning Signs **

Then in October of 1995, Asbell and Karenty became concerned when a large half-inch gap spanning the width of the banquet hall appeared. The following inspection indicated that many of the vertical piles and out-shore end of the pier were leaning and moving eastward, and the fill dirt underneath was seeping into the water. On November 1 of 1995 the suit alleged that Hudson informed Asbell that the pier required $1.2 million in repairs to stabilize the structure. Upon receiving the news Asbell asked Hudson to cease the documentation of pier’s problem and that it would jeopardize plans of docking The Moshulu at the pier, “The old lady isn’t going to go for this,” Karetny told Hudson. Two days later on November 3, 1995, Asbell agrees to emergency plan of installing retaining cables to keep the pier from further movement, the plan would cost $60,000. But soon, Asbell orders the cables removed, and instead, used ten A-frame supports installed around the end of the pier. This attempt was an ill advised, non-engineered repair, a self-described temporary Band-Aid. Upon learning this course of action Hudson warns Asbell that it would not solve the problem of the pier shifting to the east. Then in May of 1996, with Hamilton’s approval, The Moshulu arrived at the pier and opened for business. In April of 2000 a section of an unoccupied pier across the river in Camden on the New Jersey side collapses into the river. This was another warning sign of over-all condition of the piers in the area; most of the piers were around a hundred years old. A month later, on May 9, a gas leak appeared, and a contractor was called in to do the repair and discovered that the pipe had been bent and pulled towards the river.

On May 10, 2000, the nightclub reopens as Heat, and six days later on May 16, while performing an inspection diver Joe Moore of Commerce Construction noticed at the out-shore end of the pier the piles were twisted and Karetny was taken immediately to see the situation firsthand. Upon further inspection, divers noticed that the fill dirt was draining through cracks underneath the banquet hall. The dive supervisor Morey made the decision that the structure is imminent danger of collapse and order his diver out of the water to safety. This course of action should have signaled Karetny and Asbell that the pier was unsafe, and should close down the club for much needed repairs.
 * The Collapse **

Two days later on May 18, Tyson of Commerce Construction noticed that the previous crack across the banquet hall had widen, multiple bolts were broken and a shift in the banquet hall showing the structure had moved eight to nine inches in two days. Tyson was on the record saying that he told Asbell and Karenty that the pier is “in a state of failure” and judging from the situation “Your pier will probably collapse tonight between 8 and 9pm.” But Tyson did not specifically order the closing of the pier. And upon cross examination by Defense attorney Frank De Simone as to why he did not follow up and call, fax or in writing urging them to close the club. Tyson said “I told them the pier was going to collapse at 8 to 9 o’clock to their face, you don’t get more direct than that.” However, Karenty and Asbell would later deny that Tyson ever warned them that the pier was about to collapse.

The morning of the same day a second gas leak was discovered. And the same contractor return to find that culprit was the same gas pipe that leaked before and again it was bent towards the river, further signaling a shift in the structure. The contractor also noticed that two men were filling a crack in the floor with cement. Later on in the afternoon, by the order of Karenty, two Heat security employees placed a piece of sheet metal and a piece of carpet with flowerpots over the crack in the banquet hall. Tyson then told Hudson the pier was in danger of collapse and the out-shore end of pier was being closed off, which Hudson later denies the conversation ever took place. Then just after 8PM, the inevitable happened, 140-foot section of the pier collapsed into Delaware River.

On June 6, 2000 grand jury convened and began to hear testimony in the collapse. And on the June 26, first of the three wrongful death suits is filed against Portside Investors, HMS Ventures, and Commerce Construction. Then on November 6, HMS Ventures files suit against J.E. Brenneman Co., Commerce Constructions, S.T Hudson Engineers; Jesse Tyson and Robert Hudson for $25 million dollars in damages. In this suit alleges HMS was never informed of the true condition of the structure, therefore the engineering firms were to blame for the collapse, and the engineering firms not HMS are liable for the personal injury claims.
 * The Legal Battle: Civil Phase **

After extensive investigation, on August 21 of 2001, District Attorney Lynne Abraham filed criminal charges against Asbell and Karetny. Both were charged with three counts of involuntary manslaughter; 43 counts of reckless endangerment; risking catastrophe; failure to prevent catastrophe and criminal conspiracy. According to DA’s office “We believe the officials at the pier knew all about the problems and failed to properly resolve them. They relied on patchwork and hoped it would get them through the summer.”

Then on June 4 of 2002, Judge Benjamin Lerner of Common Pleas Court dismisses felony charges against Asbell and Karetny, with only lesser charges and involuntary manslaughter charges were allowed. D.A.’s office appeals the judge’s decision. And on October 27, 2003, the state Superior Court upheld the ruling of Judge Lerner of Common Pleas Court. D.A.’s office also appealed that ruling. At this time, over 40 civil suits were still pending due to complication of ongoing criminal case, in which there was fear that information discovered during the civil phase might incriminate the defendants during criminal case.

On January 29, 2004, under the leadership of Common Pleas Judge William Manfredi, wrongful-death suits were settled. A decision of $29.5 million will be paid to the plaintiffs, 25% to each of the deceased victims, and remaining 25% will be divided among 40 or so injured. The city’s portion was capped at $500,000 by state law, a result of political subdivision tort claims act.

During the trial, a real estate expert, Robert S. Griswold of Griswold Real Estate Management in San Diego, a member of the elite group of Realtors with the designation “counselor of real estate”, was hired by the plaintiffs prepared an report for Judge Manfredi, stating that Asbell, Karetny and Hamilton all share responsibility for the disaster. In his report, Griswold stated that:

“ "…the warning signs - such as the dramatic expansion of the cracks and increase in number of cracks between May 16 and May 18 - were so obvious that … the decision to open the pier constituted a conscious and reckless indifference to the safety and well being of the public." Furthermore, after reviewing Dorrance Hamiton’s role in the decision of pier repairs in 1995, Griswold concluded that Hamiton was fully aware of the pier’s condition after partial collapse in 1994 and a barge collision with the pier in 1955; therefore she was also liable for the collapse. "Yet she made the decision to dock the Moshulu at pier 34 and expand HMS's operations to include a nightclub, restaurant and ballroom on the pier…” No criminal charges were ever filed against Hamilton.

** Then on August 16, 2005 with 6-0 majority opinions, justices of Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled to reinstate the felony charges of risking a catastrophe and conspiracy. Justice Ronal D. Castille stated that prosecutors “had substantial evidence…that Asbell and Karetny… engaged in what amounted to a literal cover-up: They ordered that the ever-growing crack in the floor of their banquet building - tell-tale evidence of the very real calamity awaiting any person who ventured onto the premises - be concealed." On June 22, 2007, Eli Karetny pleaded guilty to three counts of involuntary manslaughter and 43 counts of reckless endangerment. Michael Asbell pleaded no contest to the same counts, and one count of conspiracy and one count of risking catastrophe. Judge Sheila Woods-Skipper sentenced Asbell with 11 to 22 months of house arrest plus probation, and Eli Karetny was sentenced to 9 to 18 months of house arrest with probation, despite the request for the judge to sentence the two men to at minimum of three years in prison by the prosecution. In Addition, Asbell and Karetny were also ordered to start an entrepreneurship program for inner-city high school students, and per order of the Judge, the program is to be named after the three victims, with additional 1000 hours of community service.
 * The Legal Battle: Criminal Phase

According to The Associated Press, few days before the sentencing, Mayor John F. Street sent a letter urging the judge not to send his acquaintance of 20 years, Asbell to jail, and praised Asbell for his commitment to the Philadelphia community.

Following the collapse to Pier 34, in the report //U.S. Coast Guard Report to Congress on Pier Safety// provided an overview of existing authorities and jurisdiction regarding pier safety standards and listed issues associated with improving pier safety nationwide. Within it, the report states that as a potential model for local regulation of piers is the one developed by the city of Philadelphia in the aftermath of the Pier 34 collapse. As consequence of the collapse, the city of Philadelphia reviewed their oversight of the piers and enacted ordinance requiring the regular inspection and upkeep of piers and other waterfront structures.
 * The Aftermath **

In the report, The Coast Guard forwards the following recommendations (for the complete list of other finds in detail, please refer to the report): 1. Local and state governments be encouraged to review the regulatory regime for waterfront structures within their jurisdiction and determine whether appropriate measures have been taken to adequately promote safety of waterfront structures; and 2. Where standards are deemed to be inadequate and such measures are necessary, local authorities should implement a regulatory regime for the construction, maintenance, inspection and repair of waterfront structures within their jurisdiction to reduce the risk of pier collapses and risk of casualties. As consequence of the collapse of Pier 34, Mayor John Street requested that pier owners voluntarily submit inspection reports to Department of L&I. However, only 10% of the 79 major piers had submitted the voluntary report and ten owners closed their piers entirely rather than absorbing the cost of inspection. Realizing that there were no standard regulations or building codes applicable specifically to piers, and with such a lack of voluntary inspection, the city decided that it was necessary to enact a mandatory inspection requirement for each pier to ensure safety of the public. (Bill No. 020310 amending Title 4 of The Philadelphia Code, Subcode “PM”, Section PM-303.0 and PM-307.0).


 * Bibliography**

__Primary__: “U.S. Coast Guard: Report to Congress on Pier Safety 2000” Councilmember Mariano. “Bill No. 020310. Referred to the Licenses and Inspections: An Ordinance” 9 May 2002 Case file name: In re: Pier 34 Litigation

__Secondary__: Philadelphia Reginal Port Authority History [] Manion, M. __Engineering Ethics: Theories, Concepts, and Case Studies__ (2008). Soteropoulos J. “Felonies Resorted in Pier Collapse” __The Philadelphia Inquirer__ 16 August 2005. “Jurors are deadlocked in case of Philadelphia pier collapse” __The Associated Press__ 7 November 2006 Weichselbaum S. “2 Will Face Trial in 3 Pier Deaths” __Philadelphia Daily News__ 16 August 2005 Hawkins A. “Pier 34 Plaintiffs Settle for $6.1 Mil” __The Legal Intelligencer__ 10 September 2004 Caruso D. “Pier Collapse Defendants Still Face Civil Lawsuits” __Courier Post__ 5 June 2002 “3 Killed and Dozens Are Hurt As Philadelphia Pier Collapses” __The New York Times__ 19 May 2000, Page 24. Soteropoulos J. “Engineers’ Testimony Traces The Deterioration of Pier 34” __The Philadelphia Inquirer__ 15 November 2001 Egan, N. “Pier Payback – Settled for $29.6M: Judgment Ends Civil Phase of Deadly Pier 34 Tragedy.” “Philadelphia Pier Collapse Investigated.” __Los Angeles Times__ 20 May 2000. Madan, R. “House Arrest Sentences in Pier 34 Trial.” __Associated Press__ 22 June 2007. “Charges In Pier Collapse.” __New York Times__ 16 August 2005. Campisi, G. “Two Philadelphia Nightclub Owners Faces Charges in Pier Collapse.” __Philadelphia Daily News__ 22 August 2001. Shaw, J. “Engineers blamed in Pier 34.” __Philadelphia Inquirer__ 22 October 2006. Shaw, J. “Pier 34 Foundation Deteriorate years before collapse.” __Philadelphia Inquirer__ 25 September 2006. Bishop, T. “Danger Signs Ignored Before Fatal Pier Collapse in Philadelphia.” __World Socialist__ 1 June 2000. “News On Pier 34 Is Expected Today” __The Philadelphia Inquirer__ 26 May 2000.

__Reference__: [] []